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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Green v. Crowell, Deputy Com'r (1934) 69 Fed. (2nd) 762; Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp. v. Monahan (1932) 57 Fed. (2nd) 217; Kropp v. Parker
(1934) 8 Fed. Supp. 290. In Krentz et al. v. Durning (1934) 69 Fed. (2nd)
802, 804, the court said, "were not its scope (Crowell v. Benson) so con-
fined, it would have overthrown the accepted procedure of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Shipping Board,
the Board of Tax Appeals, and we should suppose, the assessment of dam-
ages in admiralty by a commissioner."
The present case relies on Mfr's R. v. United States (1918) 246 U. S.
457, at 480-490, as holding that new evidence is admissible on the issue of
confiscation. In that case the United States contended that the findings of
the Commission upon the subject of confiscation were not subject to attack
upon evidence not presented to the Commission. The Court said, "We can
not sustain this objection in its entirety." It went on to say, that though
correct practice required that all pertinent evidence should first be sub-
mitted to the Commission, and that thus it could not approve the proce-
dure in this case, since the issue of confiscation was in the case the Court
should deal with it. Except in this doubtful precedent, it has been held, in
non-reparation cases, that the courts are limited to a review of the evidence
taken before the Commission. United States v. L. & N. R. Co., supra;
1. C. C. v. Union Pao. R. Co., supra; L. & N. R. Co. v. United States (1914)
218 Fed. 89; Oregon R. R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild (1912) 224 U. S. 510;
I. C. C. v. IlL. Cent. R. Co. (1910) 215 U. S. 452. Thus it seems that the
court in the principal case has relied upon a solitary case rather than upon
much more clearly defined counter authority.
P. A. M. '36.
ORAL CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-NOT TO BE PERFORMED IN ONE
YEAR.-Plaintiff sued defendant on an oral promise to pay a note of de-
fendant's brother, renewed for one year, from proceeds of an insurance
policy insuring the life of his brother, when received by the promisor as
beneficiary, if the maker died before the end of a year. Held, that the oral
promise was invalidated by the statute of frauds provision adopted in New
York in April, 1933 (chap. 616 of Laws of 1933, amending sec. 31 of the
Personal Property Laws), which provision declares void all agreements not
in writing "performance of which is not to be completed before the end of
a lifetime." Terminello v. Bleecker (July, 1935) 280 N. Y. Supp. 326.
The instant case is the first reported case to adjudicate upon the statute
as amended, and the case is directly within the provisions of the act since
the alleged promise did not become operative until the death of the promi-
sor's brother, therefore, the performance of the contract by the promisor
was not to be completed before the end of the maker's lifetime.
The statutes of most jurisdictions do not include such a provision: (that
they do not) see R. S. Mo. 1929 sec. 2967; Cahill's Ill. Rev. Statutes, chap.
59, sec. 1; but provide only that contracts not to be performed within one
year, to be valid, must be in writing. Most jurisdictions, therefore, hold
that where an obligation is to continue during the lifetime of a specified
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person, or where the contract is of such a personal nature that the death
of the promisor would terminate the agreement, the statute does not apply,
for it is possible that the contingency on which it is based may happen with-
in the year. Doyle v. Dixon (1867) 97 Mass. 208; Rlwell v. Assurance Go.
(1918) 230 Mass. 248, 119 N. E. 794; Foster v. McO'Blenis (1853) 18 Mo.
88; Winters v. Cherry (1883) 78 Mo. 345; Green v. Whaley (1917) 271 Mo.
638, 197 S. W. 355; Kent v. Kent (1875) 62 N. Y. 560; Thorp 'v. Stewart
(1887) 44 Hun. 232; Frost v. Tarr (1876) 53 Ind. 390; Henry v. Reed
(1909) 80 Kans. 380, 102 Pac. 846; Quirk v. Bank (C. C. A. Tenn. 1917)
244 Fed. 682; Seder v. Grand Lodge (1922) 35 Idaho 277, 206 Pac. 1052;
Ford Motor Co. v. Maddox (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 3 S. W. (2d) 911; Boggs
v. Snoddy (Va. 1926) 131 S. E. 830; Eiseman v. Schneider (1897) 60 N. J.
L. 291. Furthermore, contracts which are to be performed upon the death
of a certain person are not governed by the statute of frauds. Wells v.
Horton (1826) 4 Bing. 40, 130 Eng. Rep. 683; McNamara . Madden (Ky.
1897) 39 S. W. 697. The test of whether a contract is within the statute
of frauds is whether at the time such agreement was made it could have
been performed within a year, and not whether in fact such contract was
so performed, hence, if performance within one year is possible, the con-
tract is not repugnant to the statute. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ritsher (1915)
196 Ill. App. 27. Such a test supplies the rationale for those cases which
hold personal service contracts not to be within the statute since the con-
tract would be terminated by the death of the party making it. Hill 'V.
Jamieson (1861) 16 Ind. 125.
Where, however, the agreement is such that it cannot be completed within
a year, the fact that it may be terminated, or further performance excused
or rendered impossible of performance by the death of one of the contract-
ing parties, or of another person, during the year, is not sufficient to take
it out of the statute. Doyle v. Dixon, supra; Mallett v. Lewis (1883) 61
Miss. 105. It is only where death would leave the agreement fully per-
formed that it is not within the statute (as for example, an agreement to
give one employment for life). Jackson v. R. R. (1898) 76 Miss. 607, 24
So. 874; Harrington v. R. R. (1895) 60 Mo. App. 223; 2 Page, Law of Con-
tracts (1920) sec. 1305. Some cases have failed to recognize this dis-
tinction, Hill -v. Jamieson, supra; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Warren (1932)
44 S. W. (2d) 510; Peters v. Westborough (1837) 19 Pick. (Mass.) 364.
There are just causes to criticize this distinction on the grounds that prac-
tically speaking it is of little concern whether the death of the promisor be
regarded as working a performance of his agreement, or as rendering im-
possible his performance of it. Browne, Statute Of Frauds (1880) sec. 282a,
but the proposition is too well established in American case law to permit
a change. The distinction is accepted by eminent authorities. 1 Williston,
On Contracts (1931) sec. 972; Page, Law of Contracts, supra.
The provision of the New York statute, upon which the principal case
depends, although realitively unique, was preceded by Arizona and Cali-
fornia acts of some years' standing. Cal. Stats. 1907 p. 563, Code of Civ.
Pro. (1923) sec. 1973; approved in Hagan v. McNary (1915) 170 Cal. 141,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss4/18
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
148 Pac. 937. Ariz. Rev. Code 1928 sec. 1521; approved in Brought v.
Howard (1926) 30 Ariz. 522, 249 Pac. 76; Gold v. Killeen (1934) 33 Pac.
(2d) 595, 94 A. L. R. 448. The statutes of these two states differ from the
New York act only in specifying that the contingency is the "lifetime of
the promisor" whereas the New York law provides more broadly for "a
lifetime."
Prior to the enactment of the amendment there had been two conflicting
lines of decisions in New York. One line approved the general rule. Mc-
Kinney v. McClaskey (1879) 76 N. Y. 594; Kent v. Kent, supra; Gallagher
v. Finch, Pruyn & Co. (1925) 207 N. Y. Supp. 403. The other view did not
consider death so "time destroying" and personal covenants for a period of
over one year were held to be within the statute. McGirr v. Campbell
(1902) 75 N. Y. Supp. 571; Shapiro v. Balavan (1924) 205 N. Y. Supp. 208.
The utility of the new provision will depend largely upon the application
it receives at the hands of the courts. The judges in applying the provision
should keep in mind the original purpose of the statute of frauds, i. e., to
prevent frauds and perjuries, and no provision, old or new, should be so
construed as to provide an avenue of escape from the fundamental principle
of justice.
W. F. '37.
TAXATION-EQuAL PROTECTION-GRADUATED GRoss SALEs TAx.-Plain-
tiffs, a domestic corporation and a domestic partnership, each operating a de-
partment store in Louisville, a Dela ware corporation having 21 department
stores in Kentucky, and an Ohio corporation (Kroger Stores, Inc.) maintain-
ing 289 grocery stores in the Commonwealth, brought bills in the United
States District Court of Kentucky to enjoin the state officers from enforcing
an act of that Commonwealth (Ky. Acts of 1930, c. 149, p. 475) which pur-
ported to impose on all "retail merchants" an "annual license tax for the
opening, establishing, operating, or maintaining of any store or stores .... "
Sec. 2 of the act provided for a graduation of the rate of the tax in eight
steps, from 1/20 of one percent on the first $400,000, to 1 percent on the
excess of gross sales over $1,000,000, the increased rates being applicable,
however, only in respect of sales in each successive bracket. By definition
the act provided that all department and chain store systems be considered
as single units for the purpose of the tax, and expressly exempted sales of
farm and gardening products by the producers thereof. Plaintiffs charged
that the classification in the act denied them the equal protection of the
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
At final hearing the District Court sustained the act, and dismissed the
bills. On appeal;-Held: Reversed. The court is not bound by the title or
description of the tax in the act, in determining its nature and effect. The
tax in substance is merely an excise on the activity of making a sale. Al-
though the lower court found that "generally speaking" there was a rela-
tion between gross sales and net profits, the evidence indicates no constancy
of progression, nor even a rough uniformity within wide limits of tolerance,
and the application of different rates based solely on the volume of sales
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